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In September 1994, in response to a reported epidemic of plague in India, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) enhanced surveillance in the United States for
imported pneumonic plague. Plague information materials were rapidly developed and
distributed to U.S. public health officials by electronic mail, facsimile, and expedited
publication. Information was also provided to medical practitioners and the public by
recorded telephone messages and facsimile transmission. Existing quarantine protocols
were modified to effect active surveillance for imported plague cases at U.S. airports. Private
physicians and state and local health departments were relied on in a passive surveillance
system to identify travelers with suspected plague not detected at airports. From September
27 to October 27, the surveillance system identified 13 persons with suspected plague; no
case was confirmed. This coordinated response to an international health emergency may
serve as a model for detecting other emerging diseases and preventing their importation.
In the past 50 years, the speed of international
travel, as well as the number of travelers, has
accelerated, providing a mechanism for the rapid
dissemination of disease agents from one country
to another. For this reason, vigilant surveillance
is needed to prevent the importation and spread
of emergent infections. The United States needs a
response plan that involves international and do-
mestic public health officials, physicians and hos-
pitals, and the public and can be implemented at
the first indication of an international health
threat.
In 1994, in response to an epidemic of pneu-
monic plague in India, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) developed and im-
plemented an enhanced surveillance system to
supplement the existing regulations concerning
imported plague. The protocol described here may
serve as a model for detection and control of
emerging diseases imported into the United
States or other countries with frequent and di-
verse international traffic.
Background
In September 1994, India reported cases of
plague for the first time in 28 years. Plague is
caused by infection with the bacterium Yersinia
pestis. Bubonic plague is typically acquired by the
bite of fleas from infected rodents and is char-
acterized by inguinal, axillary, and/or cervical
lymphadenitis. Pneumonic plague may occur
as a secondary development to the bubonic
form or can be contracted by inhaling respira-
tory droplets from humans or other animals
with plague pneumonia (1).
Bubonic plague cases were first identified by
Indian health officials in the Beed District of Ma-
harashtra State in late August. By September 24,
more than 300 unconfirmed cases of pneumonic
plague and 36 deaths had been reported from the
city of Surat, Gujurat State, approximately 300
km west of the Beed District (2). After these re-
ports, hundreds of thousands of Surat’s two mil-
lion residents fled, some to the major cities of
Bombay, Calcutta, and New Delhi (3). Uncon-
firmed pneumonic plague cases and plague-
related deaths were subsequently reported from
several areas throughout India (4,5).
With the reported epidemic of plague in India,
the potential for spread of the disease by infected
travelers became a concern. Several countries
closed their borders to Indian travelers and cargo
and discontinued all flights of their air carriers to
and from India (6). Because of its epidemic poten-
tial, plague is listed as a Class 1 internationally
quarantinable disease in the International Health
Regulations of the World Health Organization
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tion and inspection of any vehicle or passenger
originating in an area where a plague epidemic is
in progress.
Response to the Epidemic
CDC’s domestic response to the apparent
plague epidemic in India involved two simultane-
ous and complementary components: 1) informa-
tion dissemination and education, and 2)
intensified active and passive surveillance to iden-
tify and treat suspected plague patients and their
contacts.
Information Dissemination
After the initial reports from India, information
on plague and the epidemic in India was urgently
sought by the media, the public, medical practitio-
ners, and public health officials throughout the
United States. To meet this need, CDC circulated
detailed and timely information to persons con-
cerned with the potential plague crisis. From Sep-
tember 26 to 29, CDC produced six documents for
distribution to public health officials and agencies:
1) a general plague outbreak notice, 2) a plague
alert notice for international travelers from India,
3) a plague advisory for persons traveling to India,
4) plague treatment and prophylaxis guidelines
for physicians, 5) guidelines for diagnosis and
biosafety for persons handling samples from pa-
tients with suspected plague, and 6) an article on
the Indian outbreak that ap-
peared in CDC’s widely circu-
lated Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report (MMWR) (8).
CDC pursued several avenues
to convey information to medical
practitioners and the public.
Three articles on the epidemic
were published in MMWR (Sep-
tember 30, October 7, and Octo-
ber 21) (8-10). Information on
plague in general and the Indian
epidemic in particular was made
available on CDC’s Voice Infor-
mation Service, Fax Information
Service, and a special plague hot-
line telephone number. A mes-
sage intended for travelers to
India concerning the perceived
risks and appropriate prophylac-
tic measures was added to the
plague selections on the Voice Information Service
menu. Finally, all airline passengers disembark-
ing in the United States from India were given a
plague alert notice that described the symptoms
of plague and advised them to seek medical atten-
tion and notify state and federal public health
authorities if they had any febrile illness within
the next 7 days. The standard Health Alert Notice
(yellow card) of the Division of Quarantine, CDC,
was made available to all other international ar-
riving passengers and advised them of appropri-
ate measures in the event of illness.
Surveillance
The second component of CDC’s response was
to intensify active and passive surveillance for
persons entering the United States who poten-
tially had plague. Both the active  (Figure 1) and
passive (Figure 2) surveillance systems identified
not only persons suspected of having plague but
also those who might have been exposed to a
patient with plague during the contagious period.
Active Surveillance System
CDC’s Division of Quarantine maintains staff
at major international airports in seven U.S. cit-
ies: Honolulu, Hawaii; Seattle, Washington; San
Francisco and Los Angeles, California; Chicago,
Illinois; Miami, Florida; and New York, New York.
At airports where the division does not have staff,
officials of the Immigration and Naturalization
Figure 1. Active surveillance system: patient with suspected plague identified
on arrival at U.S. international airport.
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physicians, or both, serve as Quarantine Officers.
During the plague epidemic, crews on all com-
mercial aircraft originating in or continuing from
India were reminded of the regulations requiring
them to notify the Quarantine Officer at the des-
tination airport of any ill passengers and were
instructed to be especially alert for passengers
with fever, cough, or chills. When the aircraft
landed, before passengers disembarked, a Quar-
antine Officer and a Division of Quarantine con-
tract physician, in telephone consultation with the
medical officer on call at CDC’s Division of Vector-
Borne Infectious Diseases, examined any passen-
ger who reported illness and determined whether
the suspicion of plague was sufficient to warrant
the passenger’s hospitalization and further evalu-
ation. If deemed not likely to have plague, the
passenger was placed under the surveillance of
the local health department and released with
instructions to consult a physician and to monitor
his or her temperature for the next 7 days, the
maximal incubation period for pneumonic plague
after exposure (1). All other passengers were per-
mitted to deplane and were given a copy of the
plague alert notice.
If plague had not beeen ruled out as a possible
cause of the passenger’s illness, the passenger
would have been considered a patient with sus-
pected plague and would have been placed in
isolation at the airport until he or she could be
safely transported to a predetermined hospital. In
the hospital, the patient would have been placed
under respiratory isolation conditions, diagnostic
specimens would have been obtained for testing in
the CDC plague laboratory, and appropriate anti-
biotic treatment for plague would have been be-
gun.
If the patient had been hospitalized, other pas-
sengers on the flight would have been informed
that they were under surveillance in accordance
with federal quarantine regulations. Locating in-
formation would have been obtained from all pas-
sengers, who would have been instructed to
monitor their body temperature for 7 days and to
report any illness to their county or state health
department. Because pneumonic plague is trans-
mitted from person to person through respiratory
droplets (11) and air flow on passenger airlines is
directed toward the floor (12), only passengers
seated within 2 m of the patient (proximal passen-
gers) and others with close personal contact would
have been considered at reasonable risk for secon-
dary transmission. Those proximal passengers
would have been identified and advised to begin
antibiotic prophylaxis and to continue it for 7 days.
Had a suspected plague case been laboratory-con-
firmed, the state health departments and state
epidemiologists would have contacted all proximal
passengers and monitored completion of the anti-
biotic prophylaxis. All other passengers would
have also been contacted to ensure that they con-
tinued to monitor themselves for
febrile illness.
Passive Surveillance System 
Private physicians, hospitals,
and local public health officials
were relied on to identify inter-
national air travelers from India
who became ill within a short
period (from hours to 7 days) af-
ter disembarkation and report
the illness to the appropriate
state and federal public health
officials. The attending physi-
cian, in consultation with the
CDC medical officer on call, then
determined on the basis of clini-
cal and epidemiologic evidence
whether the ill person had a rea-
sonable likelihood of having
plague. If so, the patient would Figure 2. Passive surveillance system: patient with suspected plague identi-
fied a few hours to 7 days after arrival in the United States.
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hospital, diagnostic specimens would have been
obtained, and antibiotic treatment would have
been initiated. Close contacts of the suspected
plague patient during the putative contagious pe-
riod would have been identified and advised to
begin antibiotic prophylaxis.
 A concerted effort would have been made to
determine the time the suspected plague patient
became symptomatic, and thereby contagious
(13), relative to the person’s arrival in the United
States. If the patient had been symptomatic at the
time of the flight, a passenger list would have been
obtained from the airline and the U. S. Customs
Service. State epidemiologists in the states of resi-
dence of all passengers would have been informed
of the need to contact and maintain surveillance
of passengers within their jurisdiction who were
possibly secondarily exposed. If seating assign-
ments for the flight could be obtained, passengers
seated within 2 m of the patient would have been
advised to begin antibiotic prophylaxis; all other
passengers would have been instructed to monitor
their temperature for 7 days and to report any
illness to state health officials.
Results
On September 29, plague information docu-
ments were sent by electronic mail or fax to four
Executive Committee members and 50 members
of the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiolo-
gists, 60 members of the Association of State and
Territorial Public Health Laboratory Directors, 40
Executive Board members and 50 state repre-
sentatives of the National Association of County
and City Health Officials, 132 officers in CDC’s
Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS), 15 field su-
pervisors of CDC’s Field Epidemiology Training
Program, and one representative each in the U. S.
Department of State and the Quarantine Health
Services in Canada. Although an exact count is not
available, more than 3,000 persons probably re-
ceived these documents directly from CDC or sec-
ondarily through other agencies.
From September 27 to October 31, the CDC
Voice Information Service received 6,665 calls ac-
cessing information about plague; 2,692 of these
calls were received through the special plague
hotline number. During this same period, 5,589
documents about plague were requested and sent
by the CDC Fax Information Service.
On October 25, 1994, after an on-site investiga-
tion in India, a WHO team of scientists that in-
cluded four CDC staff members, determined that
the plague epidemic was of more limited scope
than previously believed, and recommended the
lifting of travel restrictions. On October 27, 1994,
CDC authorized a stand-down of the heightened
surveillance system at all ports of entry and a
return to normal operations. During the 30 days
that the surveillance system was in place, 13
airline travelers arriving in the United States
were evaluated. Six patients with suspected
plague were identified and evaluated in airports—
JFK and La Guardia in New York City (four),
Dallas-Fort Worth (one), Chicago-O’Hare (one)—
and seven by private physicians in New York City
(five), Albany, New York (one), and St Louis, Mis-
souri (one). All 13 had a history of recent travel in
India. None was found to have plague. Symptoms
of illness included fever (eight), cough (six), vom-
iting (four), and malaise (three). The final diagno-
ses of persons evaluated were viral syndrome
(four), malaria (two), concurrent malaria and den-
gue (one), typhoid (one), end-stage liver failure
(one), and no illness (one) (14). The final diagnosis
was unspecified in three patients.
Discussion
Plague pandemics have occurred throughout
history (15). In the European epidemic known as
Black Death, from 1345 to 1360, an estimated
quarter of the world’s known population of 24
million died. Originating in central Asia and car-
ried by ship to Sicily, the disease spread east to
China, south to Africa, north to Russia and Scan-
dinavia, and west to Greenland in only a few years.
Plague in North America can be traced historically
to infected rats aboard ships from the Far East
that docked in California during the early 20th
century (16). Today, air travel that can transport
a person anywhere in the world within 24 hours
expands the opportunity for rapid spread of a
transmissible disease like pneumonic plague. The
potential for pneumonic plague to spread by air
travel to the United States during the recent In-
dian epidemic elicited considerable public concern
(7).
Although rare, plague is enzootic in the United
States, and 10 to 15 human cases are reported
each year; typically only one or two of these are
pneumonic plague cases (17). Thus, most public
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country have limited experience with plague (18).
When the Indian epidemic began, detailed and
reliable information from India was sparse;
therefore, CDC disseminated factual and compre-
hensive information regarding pneumonic plague
and the Indian epidemic to public health officials,
physicians, and private citizens. The development
and distribution of the e-mail, voice, fax, and
printed documents were coordinated through a
single branch within CDC, which ensured the
accuracy and timeliness of the information con-
veyed. By serving as the central clearing house for
international and domestic reports, CDC was able
to gather and redistribute information rapidly and
efficiently. Updates in MMWR contained data ob-
tained within hours of publication. Most public
health officials and agencies were accessible im-
mediately by electronic mail or fax, and group
mailing codes were constructed to facilitate simul-
taneous communication. These timely updates of
information, which included periodic results of the
enhanced surveillance system, heightened aware-
ness of the public health threat and encouraged
participation by health practitioners in the pas-
sive component of the surveillance system.
Like the information network, the surveillance
system was centrally coordinated at CDC, but it
relied on the contributions of many agencies and
individuals to function effectively. Federal, state,
and local health officials, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the U.S. Customs Service,
commercial businesses (passenger airlines), medi-
cal practitioners, hospital personnel, and the pub-
lic played key roles in the successful
implementation of the system. Many state and
local health departments made additional efforts
to alert the medical community to the potential for
imported plague cases, to reiterate the surveil-
lance protocol, and to emphasize the importance
of obtaining a travel history from any patient with
unexplained fever (14). This distribution of re-
sponsibility through the established public health
network was essential to effective surveillance.
In 1992, the Institute of Medicine’s Committee
on Emerging Microbial Threats to Health recom-
mended that surveillance of international infec-
tious diseases be implemented and coordinated by
a single government agency, ideally CDC (19);
subsequently, CDC developed a comprehensive
strategy for preventing emerging infectious dis-
eases in the United States (20). In its response to
the Indian plague epidemic, rather than
constructing a new system specific to this emer-
gency, CDC used a surveillance protocol that built
on the existing quarantine framework to utilize
trained staff in a position to readily respond. Fu-
ture responses to the threat of importation of
communicable diseases with epidemic potential
will require a similar network of individuals and
agencies, with specific roles and responsibilities
but sufficiently flexible to adapt to the particular
epidemiologic circumstances. A system similar to
the one described here was put in place in response
to the Ebola outbreak in Zaire in April and May
1995 (21).
A surveillance system must be effective without
becoming overly burdensome to either those
conducting the surveillance or those under sur-
veillance; it must safeguard the public health
without inhibiting commerce or interfering with
individual freedoms. In the 1370s, during the lat-
ter years of Black Death, nautical travelers to the
Republic of Ragusa, now part of Italy, were de-
tained for 40 days (from which the word
“quarantine” [quaranti giorni] derives) (15), a de-
tention period inappropriately long in light of the
current knowledge of plague’s incubation period of
2 to 7 days (1). In the recent outbreak, closure of
airports to all flights from India, compulsory quar-
antine of all international travelers, and an em-
bargo of trade with India were extreme measures
given the epidemiology of plague and the risk of
importing a case (18). Primary surveillance efforts
were focused at critical control points, i.e., inter-
national airports, where personnel resources for
identification and control of imported plague cases
are maximally efficient. The secondary system,
utilizing private physicians and state and local
health departments, permitted continued surveil-
lance that was less intensive, but geographically
expansive, without placing an unnecessary bur-
den on international air travelers.
If a case of plague had been confirmed in an
airline passenger, tracing passengers at risk
would have been a substantial undertaking. De-
pending on the interval between disembarkation
and diagnosis, hundreds of persons might have
had to be located across the country. In addition to
39 of CDC’s Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS)
Officers stationed in state and local health depart-
ments, 10 EIS Officers in CDC centers in Atlanta,
Georgia, Cincinnati, Ohio, Washington D.C., and
Fort Collins, Colorado, were recruited to assist
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contacts if necessary. EIS Officers have often been
called to assist in public health crises in which a
large complement of epidemiologists was re-
quired; in 1993, 13 EIS Officers were among the
scientists and public health officials assembled
during the outbreak of hantavirus pulmonary syn-
drome in the southwestern United States (22).
Because a rapid response to importation of a dis-
ease with epidemic potential often requires a na-
tional team of epidemiologists to assist local public
health agencies, the Institute of Medicine and
others have recommended the expansion and con-
tinued support of CDC’s EIS program (19,20,23).
The surveillance system’s first line of detection
for plague cases depended on airline personnel,
Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S.
Customs officials for the active component, and
private physicians and health care providers for
the passive component. Since the former are not
trained medical personnel and may not detect an
ill traveler in the absence of obvious signs and
symptoms, and the latter may not be sufficiently
alerted to the possibility of plague, diagnosis of
some plague cases could have been delayed and
not been efficiently detected by the surveillance
system. It is unrealistic to expect any system to
effectively screen all travelers returning from ar-
eas of recognized disease outbreaks. It is impossi-
ble to assess the sensitivity of the described
surveillance system since no cases of pneumonic
plague were identified either within or outside the
system. In retrospect, the risk for an imported
plague case was quite small, since the epidemic in
India was limited in time and space and had far
fewer cases than originally suspected (24). The
WHO investigative team found no evidence of
transmission in metropolitan areas other than
Surat. Most of the patients with suspected plague
in Surat came from poor neighborhoods, residents
of which would be unlikely to travel internation-
ally. In addition, the short incubation period and
severe symptoms of pneumonic plague and the
rapid deterioration of the patient’s condition, sub-
stantially limited the contagious period and the
opportunity for secondary transmission.
Although the epidemic potential for plague
makes it a good model for developing emerging
disease response capabilities, the direct applica-
bility of this program for other emerging diseases
may not be straightforward. The above protocol
was developed in response to a regionally limited
outbreak that occurred during a relatively brief
period, similar to the recent Ebola outbreak in
Zaire (21). To detect emerging diseases in the
absence of a recognized outbreak, surveillance
would need to be maintained at some baseline
level for an indefinite period. Compliance with the
enhanced plague surveillance protocol during the
short period it was in effect appears to have been
excellent, but how compliance might have waned
over weeks to months is unknown. In addition, the
protocol was specific to plague, a well-charac-
terized disease with well-described pathogenesis
and clinical features. The severe manifestations of
pneumonic plague, the short incubation and con-
tagion periods, and the availability of reliable
diagnostic tests allowed for a focused protocol that
could confidently identify cases. Other emerging
diseases may be less well characterized, or even
entirely unknown, and may require surveillance
protocols of lesser specificity. Nevertheless, the
plague surveillance system was broad enough
(and consistent with the Institute of Medicine’s
recommendation that a global infectious disease
surveillance system implement broad reporting
criteria for detection of emerging diseases [19]) to
identify four persons who had other potentially
fatal notifiable infectious diseases.
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